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Abstract in English 
This research compares systemic risk in the banking sector, the insurance sector, the 
construction sector, and the food sector. To measure systemic risk, we use extreme negative 
returns in stock market data for a time-varying panel of the 20 largest U.S. firms in each sector. 
We find that systemic risk is significantly larger in the banking sector relative to the other three 
sectors. This result is robust to separating out correlations with an economy-wide stock market 
index. For the non-banking sectors, the ordering from high to low systemic risk is: insurance 
sector, construction sector, and food sector. The difference between the insurance sector and the 
construction sector is no longer significant after correcting for correlations with the economy as 
a whole. The correction has a large effect for the banking sector and the insurance sector, and a 
smaller effect for the other two sectors. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Dit onderzoek vergelijkt systeemrisico in de bancaire sector, de verzekeringssector, de 
bouwsector en de voedingssector. Om systeemrisico te meten, gebruiken we voor elke sector de 
extreme waarden van de fluctuaties in aandelenkoersen voor een tijdsvariërend panel van de 20 
grootste bedrijven in de VS. We vinden dat systeemrisico significant groter is in de bancaire 
sector vergeleken met de andere drie sectoren. Dit resultaat blijft overeind als we corrigeren 
voor correlaties met algemene aandelenindex. Voor de niet-bancaire sector is de volgorde van 
hoog naar laag systeemrisico: verzekeringssector, bouwsector, en de voedingssector. De 
verschillen tussen de verzekeringssector en de bouwsector zijn niet meer significant na correctie 
voor correlaties met de aandelenindex. De correctie heeft een groter effect voor de bancaire 
sector en de verzekeringssector in vergelijking met de andere twee sectoren. 
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Abstract
This research compares systemic risk in the banking sector, the insurance sector, the construction
sector, and the food sector. To measure systemic risk, we use extreme negative returns in stock market
data for a time-varying panel of the 20 largest U.S. rms in each sector. We nd that systemic risk is
signicantly larger in the banking sector relative to the other three sectors. This result is robust to
separating out correlations with an economy-wide stock market index. For the non-banking sectors,
the ordering from high to low systemic risk is: insurance sector, construction sector, and food sector.
The dierence between the insurance sector and the construction sector is no longer signicant after
correcting for correlations with the economy as a whole. The correction has a large eect for the
banking sector and the insurance sector, and a smaller eect for the other two sectors.
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The 2007-08 crisis has forcefully shown the impact on the real economy and the cost to society of a
systemic banking crisis. This has triggered renewed eorts to measure the risk of such a crisis occurring.
Measurement of systemic risk would help regulators in their risk assessments. In addition, it is a necessary
rst step in the analysis of the drivers of systemic risk.
It is generally accepted that the banking sector is more fragile than other sectors. Banks are more
fragile than nonnancial rms because of the inherent maturity mismatch on their balance sheet, which
makes them vulnerable to bank runs. Furthermore, contagion within the nancial sector can amplify
and spread initially localized problems to other banks. Finally, the banking sector interacts with the
real economy, resulting in an additional mechanism that can amplify and propagate shocks hitting the
nancial sector.
We use an indicator for systemic risk rst proposed by Huang (1992) and further developed in Hart-
mann et al. (2004), which measures the expected number of institutions that experiences an extreme
event given that at least one institution experiences such an extreme event. In accordance with this
literature, we use stock prices to dene an extreme event as an extreme negative return. As our focus is
on extreme events which are by denition very scarce, our research is in the eld of extreme value theory
(EVT). A parametric estimation of the tail behavior enables us to make out-of-sample estimates of the
systemic risk indicator.
The stock price based approach constrains our results to listed rms, but stock data is available for
most of the largest banks. A side benet of the stock price based approach is that our risk measure is
also of interest for investors considering the downside risk of a diversied asset allocation within a specic
sector, especially the banking sector. Although extreme negative returns generally do not correspond to
a bank failure, we will refer to them as such. To the extent that stock prices are forward-looking, the
indicator may act as an early warning system for systemic crises. The underlying assumption is that
stock market data reects all publicly available information about (i) individual asset and liability side
risks and (ii) dependencies between dierent banks' risks. This means that stocks are assumed to be
suciently liquid.
Using the systemic risk indicator, we do two things. First, we examine if systemic risk is actually
higher in the banking sector than in other sectors. We compare the risk measure for the banking sector
with the insurance sector and two non-nancial sectors, the food sector and the construction sector. We
expect systemic risk to be larger in the banking sector than in the other sectors.
Second, we try to separate out extreme events that are driven by the correlation with the economy as
a whole. To this end, we use returns conditional on the market return, besides the unconditional returns,
such that the eect of the market return is eliminated. The remaining dependencies in the conditional
returns describe systemic risk in the nancial sector that is uncorrelated to the market portfolio, which we
interpret as uncorrelated to the economy as a whole. Thus, they describe shocks and common exposures
to other factors than the market return, possibly amplied by the eect of contagion.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Basically, systemic risk can be dened based
1on dierent types of data, e.g., balance sheet data, CDS-spreads, or stock return data.1 Some papers
estimate the probability of a failure for a specic bank from its so-called distance to default (see, e.g.,
Crosbie and Bohn (2003), Gropp et al. (2009), and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009)). This distance
equals the number of standard deviations by which the expected asset value exceeds the default point.
It requires balance sheet data to determine the default point, and stock market data to determine the
standard deviation and the expected asset value. However, balance sheet data are only available at a
yearly or quarterly frequency and are vulnerable to so-called window dressing. Moreover, some important
balance sheet items may be represented by unavailable o-balance sheet data.
Other papers use credit default swap (CDS) rates to estimate the probability of a failure (see, e.g.,
Huang et al. (2009) and Giglio (2010)). A CDS provides insurance on the payments of a bond in case
of a credit event, where the underlying bond may also be issued by a non-listed rm. A disadvantage is
that most CDS spreads are only available since a few years. Furthermore, CDS spreads are sensitive to
changes in perceived counterparty risk, and the liquidity of CDS markets may be limited. This means
that movements in CDS spreads are not necessarily associated with changes in the size of capital buers.
Our paper is also related to several other works that use stock prices. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010)
dene the rm-specic CoVaR for banks as the dierence in value-at-risk (VaR) for the nancial system
when a particular bank comes into distress. The CoVaR measure is estimated by employing quantile
regressions on weekly return data. Each CoVaR corresponds to the banks' contribution to the aggregate
systemic risk.
Papers that apply EVT and focus on extreme returns in stock market data are more directly related
to our work. Indeed, using EVT Longin (2001) shows that the correlation of large negative returns is
much larger than the correlation of positive returns. Bae et al. (2003) evaluate contagion in nancial
markets based on the co-incidence of extreme return shocks across countries within a region and across
regions. Contagion is predictable at a short horizon and depends on regional interest rates, exchange
rate changes, and conditional stock return volatility. Slijkerman et al. (2005) nd with a bivariate
EVT approach that the ten largest European insurers share more interdependencies than the ten largest
European banks. Hartmann et al. (2007) assess bank contagion risk in Europe and the United States by
adopting multivariate EVT to estimate the simultaneous crash probabilities of stock returns. A structural
increase in bank contagion risk has taken place over the second half of the 1990s, both in Europe and the
U.S. The exposure of banks to extreme systematic shocks is estimated by the likelihood of a co-crash of
a stock return and the market return. This exposure is roughly comparable for Europe and the U.S.
Zhou (2010) employs EVT to compare three related bank-specic measures of systemic risk. The
Pearson correlation coecient of any of the measures and the size of the bank turn out to be insignicant.
B uhler and Prokopczuk (2010) estimate dependencies within several sectors by conducting a multivariate
EVT approach. A parametric copula is estimated with stock prices of the ve most important rms
in each sector. They nd that systemic risk in the banking sector is indeed signicantly larger than in
all other sectors of the economy. In particular, it diers from the systemic risk in the insurance sector.
To our knowledge, B uhler and Prokopczuk (2010) is the only study which has thus far compared the
dependencies in the banking sector with other sectors empirically.
1Extensive overviews of the literature on systemic risk are in De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), and Allen et al. (2010).
2We add to this literature in the following ways. First, we compare systemic risk in dierent sectors.
We nd that systemic risk is signicantly larger in the banking sector compared to other sectors. This
is in line with the results of B uhler and Prokopczuk (2010), but we assess a considerably larger sample
of rms. Our result is robust to separating out correlations with the economy as a whole by determining
returns relative to an economy-wide stock market index. For the non-banking sectors, the ordering from
high to low systemic risk is: insurance sector, construction sector, food sector. The dierences between
the sectors are all signicant. Using returns conditional on the market return, the dierence between the
banking sector and the insurance sector is no longer signicant. The correction has a large eect for the
banking sector and the insurance sector, and a small eect for the other two sectors.
Second, we compare the systemic risk measure as determined by using a recently developed parametric
estimation method with nonparametric estimation. We nd that the dierence is limited for our risk
measure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the employed dependence measure. The
empirical implementation of the dependence measure is considered in section 3. Section 4 contains our
empirical results. Robustness issues are addressed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Systemic risk measure
Our starting point to assess systemic risk for a particular sector is the fragility index which was rst
proposed in Huang (1992), and applied in Hartmann et al. (2004), Poon et al. (2004), De Vries (2005)
and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009). It is dened as the expected number of failing rms given that at
least one rm is failing:
FI := E[j  1] (2.1)
where  represents the number of failing rms. By conditioning on the event of at least one failure,
FI measures the cross-sectional dependencies between failures. The measure FI is always between zero
and the number of considered rms (N), and tends to increase in the number of considered rms. We
therefore select a time-varying subsample of a xed number n0 of the largest rms.2 Let the dummy
variable S
(n0)
i indicate if rm i is among the selected n0 rms. The dummy variable Ci indicates if rm i







































2This improves upon the common approach in the literature where a xed set of rms is considered, since our approach
handles a potential survivorship bias. Nevertheless, we show in section 5 that our results are qualitatively the same for
both approaches.
3To improve interpretability, we consider the expected fraction of additional failing rms (EAF) given that















(n0) is a simple linear transformation of FI
(n0) such that EAF
(n0) is between zero and
one.3 We multiply EAF
(n0) by 100 to express this dependence measure as a percentage instead of a
fraction.
3 Implementation
This section discusses how the sectoral dependence measure EAF
(n0) is determined from the empirical
data.
3.1 Data
We employ U.S. equity data and a value-weighted market index from the Center for Research for Security
Prices (CRSP) for the period 1993-2009. Commercial banks, insurance companies, the construction sector
and the food sector are identied by Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) 6000-6199, 6300-6499, 1500-1799
and 2000-2099, respectively. We will simply use the term banking sector to refer to the commercial
banking sector. We use daily returns as is standard in the EVT literature in nance. This assures a large
number of observations.4 A potential drawback is that extreme events might not be identied in a series
of daily returns if the corresponding information is gradually revealed on dierent days.
Table 1 shows that for all sectors the total number of rms in our sample varies considerably over time.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the daily log returns of the considered sectors. On average,
the daily log returns are highest for banks. This is attributable to a larger fraction of very high positive
returns, since the skewness is also higher on average. Compared to the banking sector, the average return
in the insurance sector is smaller, more volatile, and admits less skewness but more kurtosis. Further,
insurance companies are on average larger than banks. The normal distribution is inappropriate to model
the returns since excess kurtosis is detected in all considered sectors.
Banks and insurance companies are less sensitive to the market return than the cyclical construction
sector, whilst they are about as sensitive to the market as the non-cyclical food sector. This market
sensitivity captures the direct exposure to macro-economic shocks as well as the indirect exposure that
arises from contagion as well as feedback eects with the real economy.
We use a time-varying sample of the 20 largest rms for each day. Due to the larger number of rms,
the size of the largest twenty banks exceeds the sector average by a larger multiple than observed in the
other sectors. Table 2 further shows that the largest twenty banks are more sensitive to the market return
3Appendix A briey discusses how EAF(n0) is related to copula functions.
4We are constrained by the fact that intra-day prices are unavailable.
4Table 1: Number of rms by year for each sector
Firms are only counted if at least 245 stock returns for the corresponding year are available.
Banking Insurance Construction Food
sector sector sector sector
1993 477 185 59 99
1994 551 201 69 110
1995 583 198 72 114
1996 636 199 75 120
1997 724 188 78 121
1998 746 185 73 118
1999 781 166 69 118
2000 742 152 61 109
2001 692 141 56 93
2002 673 135 48 95
2003 659 136 45 91
2004 614 138 44 87
2005 597 142 45 82
2006 581 140 44 83
2007 563 133 46 80
2008 541 120 41 81
2009 506 116 40 79
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for daily log returns for the period 1993-2009.
The sensitivity to the market, , is based on monthly returns relative to the value weighted index from CRSP.
The mean size is the cross-sectional mean of the mean market capitalizations for each rm. The twenty rms
constituting the top 20 have the largest maximal market capitalization. The rms constituting the time-varying
top 20 are for at least one day among the twenty rms with the largest market capitalization. The sample period
is 1993-2009.
Banking Insurance Construction Food
sector sector sector sector
SIC 60-61 63-64 15-17 20
Total number of rms 1,523 347 132 218
Mean daily log return (10 4) 1.56 0.773 -3.42 -0.61
Mean st.dev.(10 2) 3.47 3.52 5.71 4.45
Median st.dev.(10 2) 2:72 2:85 4:36 3:30
Mean skewness 0.30 -0.37 -0.32 0.20
Median skewness 0.20 0.08 0.18 0.15
Mean kurtosis 29.62 41.71 28.66 22.68
Median kurtosis 12.82 16.89 11.52 12.10
Mean size (mln $) 0.88 2.27 0.43 2.24
Mean size (top 20, mln $) 35.31 23.53 1.88 20.25
Mean  (all rms) 0.56 0.77 1.09 0.65
Mean  (top 20) 1.15 0.94 1.33 0.56
Number of rms (time-varying top 20) 51 49 59 40
5than the industrial average. This may reect the fact that small banks have a more regional scope such
that the sensitivity to the country-wide market index is smaller. The largest twenty banks have a larger
market sensitivity than the largest twenty insurance rms, but this sensitivity is smaller than the largest
twenty rms in the construction sector.5 Under the assumption that failures of larger rms have a larger
impact on the real economy, it is thus worthwhile to focus on the large rms. Otherwise, results may be
biased towards the characteristics of the smaller rms.
The time-varying sample of the largest twenty rms appears to be more stable over time for sectors
where the largest rms are less sensitive to the market return. For instance, only 40 dierent rms in the
non-cyclical food sector are at least for one day in the top 20 of largest rms, while this number is 59 for
the cyclical construction sector.
From time series to probabilities
A failure of rm i is dened as the event that the daily log stock return Ri is below some negative
threshold return qi:
fCi = 1g = fRi  qig =
n
~ Ri  1
o
where ~ Ri = Ri=qi is the scaled daily log return. We dene ~ Rmax as the cross-sectional maximum of scaled
returns of the selected rms:




o ~ Ri (3.1)




, then corresponds to the event n
~ Rmax  1
o
.
Some simultaneous failures are at least partly attributable to simultaneous increases in the volatility
of stock returns due to the presence of heteroskedasticity (see, e.g., Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) or
Bollerslev et al. (1992)). For instance, stock volatilities were unusually high during the nancial crisis
triggered by a large uncertainty in future cash ows. The high stock volatilities reinforced the impact
of any news event on the stock returns. As a consequence, clusters of simultaneous extreme negative
returns were observed during this period. The eect of heteroskedasticity can in principle be eliminated
by estimating a GARCH model for each return series to adjust the series for the time-varying volatility
(see, e.g., Bae et al. (2003) or Poon et al. (2004)). Nevertheless, as argued in Hartmann et al. (2007),
banking supervisors need to know the likelihood that one or several banks fail given that a bank fails,
or given that there is an adverse macroeconomic shock. This pertains to simple unconditional returns.
Furthermore, they argue that banking regulations are determined in advance for longer periods of time.
This means that they cannot be based on the short-term volatility forecasts from a GARCH model. As
a robustness check, we show in section 5 that our results are also valid for GARCH ltered returns.
A considerable part of the correlation between stock returns might be explained by the common
exposure to macro-economic shocks. We lter out this eect to assess the impact of this common exposure
5Appendix B contains a list of the 20 largest rms in each sector.
6on the dependencies. Therefore, we estimate for each rm i a simple market model
Ri;t = i + i;tRM;t + "i;t (3.2)
where RM;t denotes the daily return of the market index. By the forward-looking nature of stock prices,
the market sensitivity i;t captures the direct exposure to macro-economic shocks as well as the indirect
exposure that arises from pro-cyclical eects. Time-variation in the market sensitivity is taken into
account by estimating market betas with rolling windows of ve years. Each time window provides for
each rm i the beta for the last year in the time window. In this way, we are able to estimate the market
sensitivities for the full sample in a similar way.6 It is tacitly assumed here that the linear dependence
relation between the stock prices and the market return is valid for all market returns.
The daily residuals from the market model (3.2), i.e., the abnormal returns ei;t = Ri;t  ^ i  ^ i;tRM;t,
are measures for the stock return conditional on the market return.7 A failure conditional on the market
return corresponds to a low realization of ei;t. Therefore, the dependence measure for the conditional
returns employs for the scaled conditional returns the scaled series ~ Ri;t = ei;t/qi, where qi is the negative
failure level for the conditional returns ei;t.
Regardless if the scaled returns are based on raw returns or conditional returns, the dependence





















The constant n0 is a positive integer number which we set at 20. We obtain as follows a time series for each
of the random variables S
(n0)
i from empirical data: A rm's size is dened as its market capitalization,
which is measured by the product of the closing price and the number of shares outstanding. This means
that the instantaneous market capitalization is aected by extreme negative returns. Hence, selecting
returns of the n0 largest rms based on the instantaneous market capitalization would tend to exclude
some extreme negative returns. We omit this potential selection bias by selecting the largest n0 rms




The time series of scaled daily returns ~ Ri of rm i is based on the time series of the rm's daily
stock return Ri and the failure level qi. These series are in turn used for the cross-sectional maximum of
selected scaled returns, ~ Rmax. The daily stock returns are directly obtained from the data. For the failure
level qi, we use the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a rm which is the convenient approach in risk management.8
6We added returns for the period 1989-1992 to obtain estimates for the rst years of the sample 1993-2009. Monthly
returns are used to mitigate the impact of outliers in the series of daily stock returns on the OLS regression. Regressing
average monthly returns in the nancial sector on (the change of) the federal funds rate or the 10 year U.S. treasury rate
did not yield any signicant result in an OLS setup. Further, the term spread was insignicant. The same holds true when
one considers one year lagged interest rates. This has led us to restrict the model to the market model. We show in section
5 that our results are robust under including a quadratic market return variable in 3.2.
7If the true model for rm i is given by Ri;t = +RM;t+Zi;t+i;t, then the estimated parameter ^ i in the restricted
model Ri;t = i + iRM;t + i;t captures the total eect of RM;t on Ri;t, as desired. This consists of the direct eect i
and the indirect eect @Zi;t

@RM;t that runs via the omitted variable Zi,t.
8The capital requirements for market risk in Basel II and in the proposed Basel III are based on the Value-at-Risk
concept.
7The complete sample of available returns for the corresponding rm is employed for the VaR regardless
if the rm is always included in the set of n0 largest rms. For a given probability pA, we set the failure
level equal to the pA%-VaR. This means that qi equals the pA% lower quantile of daily stock returns of
rm i. More formally, pA = P(Ri  qi jAi = 1), where Ai is a dummy variable indicating if the daily
stock return is available. Intuitively, the daily stock return is below the failure level once in 1/pA days.
If we choose pA = 2%, a rm is below the failure level for approximately 5 times per year, provided that
daily returns are available for the complete year. Notice that more volatile rms face a higher failure
level, but fail as frequently as stable rms.
Probability estimators
It follows from (3.3) that the measure EAF(n0) requires estimates of
(P1) the pA% Value-at-Risk quantiles q1, ..., qN to obtain the series ~ R1;:::; ~ RN.
(P2) the exceeding probabilities beyond one for the series ~ Rmax, P

~ Rmax  1

.













Estimates are based on either a nonparametric (NP) estimator or a parametric (Par) estimator. The
NP estimator is only feasible for a given failure probability pA that is suciently large. For small values
of pA, the variance in the NP estimator may be relatively large. Therefore, the Par estimator is especially
appropriate for small pA. On the other hand, the Par estimator requires a larger dataset, because the
variance of the parametric estimate of the probabilities in (3.3) is larger for a small dataset.9
We choose both the NP estimator and the Par estimator for (P1) and (P2). To be consistent, we
use the same estimator for (P1) and (P2). We use, however, always the NP estimator to estimate (P3).
Because we consider the size of a rm as given, i.e. it is given which rms are selected, the estimation






is true. This means that
unless a rm is very frequently selected into the sample, we can only use the nonparametric estimator to
estimate (P3).
NP estimator




total number of events
The quantiles qi in (P1) are such that ^ PNP(Ri  qi) = pA, where pA is the given failure probability for an
available stock return. It follows that qi is equal to the bpA (T + 1)c-th smallest return for a time series
of length T of the daily stock returns Ri of rm i.10 The nonparametric estimator is, therefore, only
dened for pA  1=(T + 1). Given an appropriate pA and some n0, we can estimate EAF
(n0) directly
9EAF(n0) can even be negative for a small dataset. This follows from the estimation procedure of the Par estimator,
which is discussed below. The point is that we separately estimate (P2) from (P3), which results in a separate estimation
bias for the numerator terms and the denominator.
10bxc denotes the largest integer not larger than x.
8from its denition by computing the mean additional fraction of selected rms that fail for the periods




(n0   1)jT1 j
X
t2T1
([#selected rms that fail in period t]   1) (3.4)
where a failure is, as before, a return below the failure level, T1 is the set of periods where at least one
selected rm fails, and jT1j is the number of periods in this set. Exactly the same result is obtained when
we estimate (P2) and (P3) with the nonparametric estimator and substitute the estimates in (3.3).
Par estimator
Extreme events are by denition rare. The method with the nonparametric estimator may be inappro-
priate for small pA since the dependence measure depends on a small number of observations such that it
admits a large variance. In that case, we can make a parametric estimate of the tail behavior to determine
EAF
(n0) (see e.g. Hartmann et al. (2004), Poon et al. (2004) and Straetmans et al. (2008)). More specif-
ically, we adopt the procedure proposed in Gomes et al. (2009) to obtain tail quantile estimators. This
novel bootstrap procedure uses besides the usual Hill tail estimator (see Hill (1975)), two second-order
parameters to arrive at a minimum variance reduced bias (MVRB) quantile estimator. The interested
reader is referred to Gomes et al. (2009) for the technical details. We address the following sequential
steps to estimate EAF
(n0) in (3.3):
(P1) the quantiles q1;:::;qN
The estimation algorithm is applied on each return series Ri in order to obtain qi and the series of
scaled returns ~ Ri = Ri/qi:
(P2) the failure probability P

~ Rmax  1

Following (3.1), we calculate the time series of the cross-sectional maximum of selected scaled
returns, ~ Rmax, from the series of scaled returns ~ Ri. We make a separate parametric estimation
for the tail of this series to estimate P

~ Rmax  1

. Namely, the estimator ^ PPar

~ Rmax  q

for
the quantile q = 1 in the denominator of equation (2.1) is obtained by implementing the following
bisection method on the employed quantile estimator: We vary the estimate c pA for the probability
P

~ Rmax  1

until the corresponding quantile estimate ^ qPar = qPar (c pA) is suciently close to
one. More specically, we get for ^ PPar

~ Rmax  1














u are the lower bound and upper bound of the i-th iteration, respectively.











(P3) We use the nonparametric estimate for (P3).
For the NP estimator as well as the Par estimator, we assign an equal probability to each time
period. In fact, we implicitly assume that the realization of the time series are a random draw from some
underlying random variable, which is a common approach for forecasting on a long time horizon.
9Inference
To test whether dierences in the dependence measure EAF
(n0) are statistically signicant, we apply a





dependence measures for X and Y , which are two dierent sets of (possibly conditional) return series




Y , and we want to test if the
dierence is signicant.









Y . For each bootstrap b, two sets X(b) and
Y (b) of articial time series of length nl are constructed by pairwise sampling n possibly overlapping blocks
of l subsequent periods from the sets X and Y .11 The blocks capture possible inter-temporal dependencies
in the series, such as volatility clustering. We bootstrap pairwise by selecting each pair of blocks over the
same period from X and Y . As a consequence, the constructed series of each bootstrap face an equal




Y (b) are based on the articial time




















We determine the systemic risk indicator for a time-varying sample of the largest 20 rms using both
unconditional returns and conditional returns, dened as the residuals from the market model (3.2). For
each of the four sectors, Figure 1 shows the expected additional fraction of extreme negative returns given
that at least one rm incurs an extreme negative return as a function of the rm-specic probability on
an extreme negative return, pA. We consider values of pA below one percent. The solid lines are the
values determined using the NP estimator, the dashed lines those using the Par estimator.
The overall picture is that the ranking of the sectoral EAF
(20) from high to low is as follows; rst the
banking sector, second the insurance sector, third the construction sector, and fourth the food sector.12
Notably, the banking sector exhibits far more systemic risk for very small pA than the other three sectors.
For instance, if a failure corresponds with an unconditional daily stock return below the 0.5% VaR level,
Figure 1 indicates that given that at least one large bank is failing, on average 8.1% of the other 19
large banks fails on that particular day. This number is only 5.0% for the insurance sector, 3.4% for the
construction sector, and about 2.5% for the food sector. If a failure is dened as a conditional return
below the 0.5% VaR level. about 4.0% of the other 19 large banks is expected to face a failure given that
at least one large bank is incurring a failure, This number is about 3.0% for the insurance sector, about
2.4% for the construction sector, and about 1.7% for the food sector. Notice that the latter number is
11As in Hartmann et al. (2007) we follow Hall et al. (1995) by setting the block length equal to l = T1=3. The number
of blocks, n, for each bootstrap is the nearest integer to T=l = T2=3.
12This contrasts with the result of Slijkerman et al. (2005) who obtain the puzzling result that systemic risk is slightly
larger for the insurance sector than the banking sector. A possible explanation for this ambiguity involves that their analysis
is restricted to a cross-sectional average of bivariate risk measures, whereas our risk measure directly considers twenty rms
for each period. Further, they consider ten large European banks and ten large European insurers, while we consider the
twenty instantaneously largest U.S. rms in each sector.
10Figure 1: EAF
(20) based on raw returns.























































(20) based on the abnormal returns from the market model (3.2).



























































11quite small because it implies for the food sector that on average only 1:32 of the twenty largest rms
fails given that at least one rm in the food sector fails.
Figure 2 shows the results for the case where a failure is dened as a conditional return below its VaR
level. The decline in the dependence measures indicates that the market return explains some part of
the sectoral variation in EAF
(20). Still, the order of the sectors is unchanged and the banking sector is
relatively more systemic for very small failure probabilities.
For any pA, EAF
(20) determined by the nonparametric estimator is hardly more than 1.5% point from
EAF
(20) determined by employing the Par estimator. Hence, we focus on the results of the nonparametric
estimator.
To assess whether the dierences between the sectors and the decline in the measure when using
unconditional results are signicant, we perform 5,000 bootstrap replications of the returns of the time-
varying sample of the largest 20 rms in each sector. Table 3 contains the P-values for the dierences in
EAF
(20) between the sectors. In each cell, the upper P-value pertains to a 0.5% probability on a rm-
specic failure, whereas this probability pA equals 1% for the lower P-value. The linearity of EAF
(20)
in FI
(20) implies the same P-values for the null hypothesis of equality of FI
(20). The upper triangle
refers to EAF
(20) based on raw returns, the lower triangle to conditional returns from the market model.
The main diagonal compares EAF
(20) based on raw returns with EAF
(20) based on residuals. More
specically, it contains the P-values for the null hypothesis that EAF
(20) is equal for the raw returns and
the conditional returns.
Table 3: Bootstrapped P-values for null hypothesis of EAF
(20;X) = EAF
(20;Y ) against the one-sided
alternative EAF
(20;X) > EAF
(20;Y ), where for the full sample EAF
(20) is larger for sector X than for
sector Y .
The upper triangle refers to EAF
(20) based on raw returns, the lower triangle to conditional returns from the
market model. The main diagonal compares EAF
(20) based on raw returns with EAF
(20) based on residuals. In
each cell, the upper P-value pertains to a 0.5% probability on a rm-specic failure, whereas this probability is
1% for the lower P-value. All results are based on 5,000 bootstrap replications of the (conditional) returns of the
time-varying sample of the largest 20 rms in each sector.
* indicates signicant at the 5% level of condence.
Banking Insurance Construction Food
sector sector sector sector
Banking sector 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
0.000* 0.003* 0.000* 0.000*
Insurance sector 0.021* 0.000* 0.004* 0.000*
0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Construction sector 0.003* 0.115 0.013* 0.019*
0.000* 0.067 0.003* 0.002*
Food sector
0.000* 0.002* 0.020* 0.018*
0.000* 0.001* 0.038* 0.003*
The upper triangle shows that for both failure probabilities, the banking sector admits signicantly
more simultaneous failures, i.e., more systemic risk, than the other three sectors.13 This dierence is also
13Unless stated otherwise, we use a signicance level of 5%.










The larger tail dependencies in the banking sector imply that tail risk of common risk factors, such as
market risk or interest rate risk, plays a relatively large role in this sector. This may stem from a larger
exposure to common factors as well as a fatter tail for common factors. Explanations for the larger
dependencies in the conditional returns of the construction sector than of the food sector include a larger
common exposure to factors that are not captured by the simple market model such as housing prices,
interest rates, etc, or fatter tails for the common factors.
In the limit pA ! 0, the risk is only determined by the factor with the fattest tail. Figure 1 suggests
that a common factor is dominant for the banking sector, whereas idiosyncratic risk is dominant for the
other three sectors.14 As was shown in Table 2, the exposure to the market return is not larger in the
banking sector than in the construction sector. Further, Figure 2 shows that after eliminating the impact
of the market return, systemic risk is about the same for the limiting case pA ! 0. Both facts suggest that
another common factor than the market return is the driving force behind the systemic risk in extreme
negative returns of the banking sector. We will show in section 5 that common heteroskedasticity explains
the sectoral dierences in the limiting case. It is left for future research to nd out which factors drive
the common volatilities of the extreme returns in the limiting case.










Besides a contagion eect on idiosyncratic shocks, explanations for the larger dependencies in the banking
sector include common heteroskedasticity, larger common exposures to other factors such as interest rates,
currencies, foreign exchanges, etc, or other mis-specications of the simple market model (3.2).
Notice from (4.2) that the insurance sector and the construction sector, no longer dier signicantly.
Apparently, the larger common exposure to the market return in the insurance sector explains the dier-
ence between these two sectors in (4.1). After correcting for this eect, the possibly larger amplication
mechanisms on idiosyncratic shocks in the insurance sector compensate for the possibly larger common
exposures in the construction sector.
The results also show that for each sector the dependence measure EAF
(20) is signicantly lower for
the conditional returns than for the raw returns. This means that a considerable proportion of each
EAF
(20) for raw returns is attributable to the possibly amplied exposure to the market return.
Table 4 shows that the decline when using conditional returns is signicantly larger for the nancial






14Notice that a contagion eect on an idiosyncratic shock transform the shock into a systematic shock.
15We obtain this result by taking the average of the two P-values in each cell.
13Notably, the larger contagion eect on the market return in the nancial sector signicantly exceeds the
eect of the larger average market beta in the construction sector.
Table 4: Bootstrapped P-values for the null hypothesis DIF
(20;X) = DIF
(20;Y ) against the one-sided
alternative DIF
(20;X) > DIF
(20;Y ), where for the full sample DIF
(20) is larger for sector X than for
sector Y .
The upper and lower P-value in each cell pertain to pA = 0:5% and pA = 1%, respectively. All results are based
on 5,000 bootstrap replications of the (conditional) returns of a time-varying sample of the largest 20 rms for
each sector. For each bootstrap, EAF
(20), is obtained for the raw returns and the conditional returns of sectors
X and Y . This gives for sectors X and Y 5,000 pairwise dierences in EAF
(20) between the raw returns and the













In this section we assess the robustness of our results by enlarging the set of failure events to less negative
returns, by taking common heteroskedasticity into account, by adding a quadratic term in the market
model, and by using a xed sample of rms, and by using rolling estimation windows.
Enlarging the set of failure events to less negative returns
The plots so far only considered failure probabilities up to 1%. Figure 3 shows that the banking sector
has still the most dependencies when raising pA up to 20%.
Heteroskedasticity
Some of the dependencies might be the result of common heteroskedasticity in stock returns. We check
this by estimating the following ARMA(1,1)-EGARCH(1,1) model for rm i:
Ri;t = i;t + i;t
i;t = i + iRi;t 1 + ii;t 1
i;t = i;tzi;t
log2
i;t = !i + izi;t 1 + i (jzi;t 1j   Ejzi;t 1j) + i log2
i;t 1
zt  t(i)
The EGARCH setup which was introduced in Nelson (1991) is able to capture the well document asym-
metric response in the volatility into account. In particular, a large negative shock tends to increase
14Figure 3: Systemic risk measures with failure probabilities up to pA = 20% for raw returns (left), abnormal
returns from the market model (3.2) (middle), and the dierence between the two measures (right). The
nonparametric estimator from (3.4) is employed.















































volatility much more than a large positive shock. We allow the standardized innovations zi;t to exhibit
fat tails by imposing a student-t distribution with i degrees of freedom.
The rm-specic parameters i, i, i, !i, i, i, i and i are estimated by maximum likelihood.
Subsequently, the dependencies in the series of standardized innovations fztg is investigated with our
systemic risk measure. This procedure is applied by taking the raw returns for Ri;t as well as by taking
the estimated abnormal returns ei;t from the market model (3.2).
Comparing Figure 4 with Figures 1 and 2 makes clear that a considerable part of the dependencies
is attributable to common heteroskedasticity in stock returns. Namely, the banking sector faces the
largest decline (not plotted), which indicates that the cross-sectional correlation in i;t is largest for the
extreme losses in the banking sector. After correcting for this eect by standardizing the returns and
conditional returns, the left and middle plot in Figure 4 show that the dependencies in the standardized
innovations are still largest for the banking sector. The order is also unchanged when pA is not too small.
For very small pA ( 0:5%), we see that common heteroskedasticity is the main driver for the larger
systemic risk in the banking sector. It is left for future research to determine the drivers of the common
heteroskedasticity.
The same results hold for the conditional losses, except that the construction sector admits somewhat
more dependencies than the insurance sector. Indeed, the dierence between the dependencies of these
two sectors was insignicant in the baseline model. Further, the dierence between the two types of
15Figure 4: Systemic risk measures for a time-varying sample of the largest 20 rms for EGARCH l-
tered returns (left), EGARCH ltered abnormal returns from the market model (3.2) (middle), and the




































EGARCH-ltered dependencies is largest for the banking sector (right plot), which suggests that the
impact of the market return is again largest for the banking sector.
Sample selection of rms
Because rms enter and leave the set of twenty largest rms, the sample of rms varies over time in the
baseline model. As a consequence, the number of rms that are for at least one day in the set of largest
rms is considerably larger than twenty for all sectors (see Table 2). As a robustness check, we employ
the same analysis for a constant sample of rms. More specically, we use the twenty largest rms that
are listed over the complete sample range 1993-2009.16 The size of a rm is measured by the maximal
size over the whole sample period.
The results in Figure 5 are very similar to Figure 1 and Figure 2. Again, the banking sector is exposed
to the largest systemic risk. The order of the other sectors is also unchanged. Moreover, the decline in
EAF
(20) when switching to abnormal returns of the market model is again largest for the banking sector.
This indicates that our results are robust to the method of sample selection.
Quadratic market model
The market model (3.2) is very parsimonious. This single-index model follows from the CAPM model
under the rather restrictive assumption that either asset returns are (jointly) normally distributed random
16The sample for the construction sector consists of only nineteen rms as no more rms are listed over the whole sample
period.
16Figure 5: Systemic risk measures for a xed sample of the largest 20 rms for raw returns (left), abnormal
returns from the market model (3.2) (middle), and the dierence between the two measures (right). The







































variables or that investors employ a quadratic form of utility. It is therefore very well possible that this
simple model does not capture the behavior in the tails of the market return. The observed skewness in
stock returns conditional on the market return has motivated some authors (e.g., Harvey and Siddique
(2000) and Barone-Adesi et al. (2004)) to consider the model
Ri;t = i + i;tRM;t + i;tR2
M;t + "i;t (5.1)
Employing the same analysis as before yields a new systemic risk measure for the abnormal returns
"i;t. The variation of this measure is plotted as a function of the failure probability pA in the middle plot
of Figure 6. The measure in the left plot is the nonparametric estimate of Figure 1 as it is based on the
raw returns. The right plot is the dierence between the two risk measures as a function of pA. Again,
the banking sector exhibits most systemic risk, and the order of the other three sectors is unchanged.
Rolling estimation windows
The baseline model employs the full sample to determine the failure levels for the returns and the abnormal
returns. This may give a distorted picture, since the increased volatility during the nancial crisis has
resulted in a cluster of exceedings of the failure level. As a robustness check, we take changes in the failure
levels into account by using rolling estimation windows of ve years. The market models are re-estimated
for each estimation window, such that the failure levels in the earlier estimation windows are not aected
by the extreme negative returns during the nancial crisis. The failure probabilities pA are set at the
0.5% VaR level for the returns as well as the abnormal returns from the market model. We check the
17Figure 6: Systemic risk measures for a time-varying sample of the largest 20 rms for raw returns (left),
abnormal returns from the quadratic market model (5.1) (middle), and the dierence between the two




































robustness of the results in (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3).
Figure 7 suggests that the result from (4.1) that the banking sector exhibits most systemic risk and
that the food sector exhibits less systemic risk are robust over time. The order of the insurance sector
and the construction sector changes over time. Figure 8 shows that the same holds for the conditional
Figure 7: EAF
(20) for rolling time windows of 5 years.

















































(20) for abnormal returns with rolling time windows of 5 years.













































Figure 9: Dierence (DIF) between EAF for returns and abnormal returns with rolling time windows of
5 years.














































returns. Figure 9 indicates that the result from (4.3) that the banking sector exhibits more systemic risk
than the non-nancial sector by the eect of the common exposure to the market return, and the result
that the food sector exhibits less systemic risk than the nancial sector by the eect of the common
exposure to the market return are robust over time. None of the gures enable us to distinguish the
systemic risk of the insurance sector from the construction sector.
Notice that Figure 7 and 8 show that the dependencies in extreme negative returns have increased
19over time in all sectors, the banking sector included. However, a clear signal indicating the nancial
crisis can not be identied from the observations prior to the crisis. This does not necessarily imply that
appropriate policy measures are infeasible.
6 Conclusions
This paper compares systemic risk in the U.S. banking sector, the insurance sector, the construction
sector, and the food sector. To measure systemic risk we use extreme negative returns in stock market
data for a time-varying panel of the 20 largest U.S. rms in each sector. We use an indicator for systemic
risk that measures the expected number of institutions that experience an extreme event given that at
least one institution experiences such an event. We determine this measure using unconditional returns
as well as using returns conditional on the market return. The latter should in principle correct for
correlations with the economy as a whole.
We have the following conclusions. Systemic risk is signicantly larger in the banking sector relative
to the insurance sector, the construction sector and the food sector. For the latter sectors, the ordering
from high to low systemic risk is: insurance sector, construction sector, food sector, where the dierences
are again signicant. This result is robust to separating out correlations with the economy as a whole
by determining stock market returns relative to an economy-wide stock market index. However, using
conditional returns, the dierence between the insurance sector and the construction sector is no longer
signicant. The correction has a large eect for the banking sector and the insurance sector, and a small
eect for the other two sectors. Thus, the correlation with the market return explains a relatively large
part of systemic risk in the banking sector. But for very extreme negative returns, the dependencies in
the banking sector are driven by common heteroskedasticity, whereas they are driven by idiosyncratic
factors in the other sectors.
In addition, we nd that for our sample the dierences between determining systemic risk using non-
parametric and parametric estimation are limited for failure probabilities above 0:1 percent. Prudential
regulation considers a failure level at 1 percent or 0:1 percent in order to evaluate risk-taking behavior of
an individual institution. For practical purposes, using a parametric estimator therefore seems to have
additional value only for even smaller p-values or shorter sample periods.
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22Appendices
A The dependency measure and copulas
We briey discuss how the dependence measure EAF
(n0) in (2.3) is related to copula functions. More




from (2.2) captures the required dependencies
between the performance of rms. The sample of n0 selected rms is given, and the rms are labeled
such that only rm 1;:::;n0 is selected. All other rms are neglected for ease of exposition.
Denote the performance of rm i, e.g., the daily stock return of rm i, by the continuous random
variable Ri. A failure of rm i corresponds with a performance below the rm-specic negative failure
level qi. Sklar's theorem says that any multivariate distribution can be written as a multivariate copula
function, C, with as the arguments the marginal distributions transformed to the interval [0;1]. The
copula function solely describes the dependence structure of the marginal distributions. By applying this
theory to the multivariate distribution function F of ( R1;:::; Rn0), we have for the probability that
none of the selected n0 rms fails:
F( q1;:::; qn0) = P( R1   q1;:::; Rn0   qn0) = C (P( R1   q1);:::;P( Rn0   qn0))
























which means that none of the rms fails with probability
P











~ Rn0  1

where ~ Ri = Ri=qi and ~ Rmax = maxi Ri. The random variable ~ Rmax is continuous by the continuity of the
underlying performance measures R1;:::;Rn. Then, the probability on the complement, P

~ Rmax  1

=
P(  1), is evaluated by the function g (r) := 1 C

~ F1 (r);:::; ~ Fn0 (r)

at r = 1, where C is the copula
function of the scaled returns ~ R1;:::; ~ Rn0 with corresponding distribution functions ~ F1;:::; ~ Fn0.17 The
one-dimensional function g(r) captures all the required dependencies for the estimation of EAF(n0). It
therefore suces to parametrize the n0-dimensional copula function C along the vector
n
~ F1 (r);:::; ~ Fn0 (r)

 r 2 R
o
;
and to evaluate the resulting function g at r = 1. As a result, it is not needed to estimate the common
failure probability for each of the possible (2n0   1) combinations of failing rms.
17C is also the copula function of ( R1;:::; Rn0).
23B Descriptives of largest 20 rms
Table 5: Largest 20 rms in each sector. Size refers to market capitalization in bln $ as measured by
stock price times number of outstanding shares. Maximum is taken over period 1993-2009.
Banking sector Max size Insurance sector Max size
1 CITIGROUP 286.5 AMERICAN INT. GROUP INC 239.9
2 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 248.1 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL 162
3 WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 146.6 UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC 85.9
4 WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW 115.6 METLIFE INC 52.6
5 FED. NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN 89.5 PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC 48.3
6 BANK ONE CORP 74.3 ALLSTATE CORP 43.2
7 U S BANCORP DEL 66.2 TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC 37.8
8 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 56.7 MARSH & MCLENNAN COS INC 36.6
9 FED. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP 50.7 HARTFORD FIN. SVCS GROUP INC 33.6
10 FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP 48.8 A F L A C INC 32.4
11 WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 44.6 AETNA INC NEW 29.9
12 VISA INC 41.8 A X A FINANCIAL INC 24.8
13 M B N A CORP 36.8 PROGRESSIVE CORP OH 24.4
14 ASSOCIATES FIRST CAPITAL CORP 35.6 AMERICAN GENERAL CORP 23.7
15 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 34.3 CHUBB CORP 23.3
16 WELLS FARGO & CO 33.5 C I G N A CORP 20.7
17 STATE STREET CORP 33.1 LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP IN 20.6
18 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 32.3 GENERAL RE CORP 19.9
19 HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC 32.2 WELLPOINT HEALTH NETWRKS 19.6
20 P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC 28.1 PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC 18.5
Construction sector Max size Food sector Max size
1 FLUOR CORP NEW 17.5 COCA COLA CO 217.1
2 D R HORTON INC 13.1 PEPSICO INC 128.1
3 PULTE HOMES INC 12.4 KRAFT FOODS INC 58.9
4 CENTEX CORP 10.2 ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC 49.6
5 TOLL BROTHERS INC 9 ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO 31
6 LENNAR CORP 8.4 SARA LEE CORP 29.9
7 K B HOME 8.1 CAMPBELL SOUP CO 28.5
8 K B R INC 7.4 GENERAL MILLS INC 23.5
9 QUANTA SERVICES INC 6 KELLOGG CO 22.3
10 N V R L P 6 HEINZ H J CO 22.2
11 RYLAND GROUP INC 3.9 BESTFOODS 20.2
12 M D C HOLDINGS INC 3.9 CONAGRA INC 18
13 HOVNANIAN ENTERPRISES INC 3.4 WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR CO 17.5
14 GLOBAL INDUSTRIES LTD 3.4 COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC 16.6
15 BEAZER HOMES USA INC 3.4 QUAKER OATS CO 13.5
16 STANDARD PACIFIC CORP NEW 3.3 RALSTON PURINA CO 12.3
17 GRANITE CONSTRUCTION INC 3.1 HERSHEY CO 12.3
18 MASTEC INC 2.7 R J R NABISCO INC 12.3
19 MERITAGE HOMES CORP 2.6 MOLSON COORS BREWING CO 10.4
20 EMCOR GROUP INC 2.4 PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP INC 9.7
24Publisher:
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
P.O. Box 80510 | 2508 GM  The  Hague
t (070) 3383 380 
March/April 2011 | ISBN 978-90-5833-504-3